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Foreword
This article arises from private conversations with
industry and other sources1 over the past 5 or so years
about their general impressions of the workings of the
European Union (EU) Internal Market. Those
discussions concerned primarily the development and
cementing of the level playing field in the manufacture,
sale and use of products subject to EU New Approach
directives intended to abolish technical barriers to trade.
Those directives are made under Article 100A of the
Treaty of Rome and provide a framework for the
manufacture and supply of such products. Whilst the
directives themselves are considered generally to be
working well, making the level playing field a clearer
reality is proving more troublesome. There are many
possible reasons for this. One of the most likely is that
serious attention is only just starting to be paid to the
need for concerted action by the current 15 EU member
States to ensure that measures are in place and working
properly to check that directives are being fairly and
evenly implemented and administered across the EU.
However, who or what checks the enforcers to ensure
that they understand directives’ requirements properly
and place no unnecessary burdens on those affected by
them? Government officials in the Member States have
policy responsibility for ensuring that directives are
implemented and administered faithfully. But disputes
concerning a product’s right to bear the CE marking or
alleged barriers to trade in such products, for example,
are more likely to be referred to lawyers …… and
ultimately the Courts, ending with the European Court
of Justice. This is a lengthy and expensive process.
Business is calling increasingly for measures to avoid
such experiences; to provide faster remedies, and to
weed out only the most contentious cases for
consideration by the Courts. An Internal Market
Ombudsman (IMO) possibly provides one remedy.
Such a facility is not without precedent and could hold
one of the keys to Making the Internal Market Work!
Further dedicated research is required to crystallise
the issues and to assist informed debate. If papers such
as this start that ball rolling, they will have achieved
much.
Introduction
Fifty years ago the visionaries responsible for the Treaty
of Rome enshrined in its text the framework for the
establishment of the Common Market: an area without
geographical frontiers where the citizens of Europe
would be able to move, work and trade freely without
undue restrictions. Such an aim was more evolutionary
than revolutionary – although listening to critics as the
process has progressed might encourage one to believe
the latter rather than the truth of the former.
How the Market has developed
No doubt anxious to avoid being hoist by their own
petard, the drafters of the Treaty of Rome took care to
be as least prescriptive as possible and to offer maximum
flexibility so that their basic wishes could be achieved
within a reasonable timescale. The Treaty, which was
signed in Rome in 1958, does not define “the Market”.
Rather, the sense of what the Founding Fathers desired
to achieve can be found early on from reading about the
Treaty’s aim to create an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe to preserve peace and to facilitate
easier (i.e. less restrictive) trading practices. Whilst
Article 2 effectively establishes “a common market and
an economic and monetary union”, Article 3 starts to put
flesh on those bones by requiring the elimination of
customs duties and quantitative restrictions “and of all
other measures having equivalent effect.”. It goes on,
inter alia,  to require the abolition of obstacles to the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Most
significantly for this paper, Article 7 states “The common
market shall be progressively established during a
transitional period of 12 years.”
Of course, translating those ambitious words into
reality has not been an easy process. There is no blueprint
for introducing and managing the massive changes they
required either to the order of things generally or the
structures and procedures on which they rely. Much has
depended upon mutual respect and co-operation –
openness and transparency in today’s jargon. In times of
particular difficulty, major political leaders have set
examples and given public leads. Mitterrand and Kohl
were particularly notable in recent years for having
staked so much personally to speed the development of
economic and monetary union. But Thatcher too made
an important mark by championing caution and
reaffirming national sovereignty. Such “opposites” might
be thought to be counterproductive. In reality they
provide the necessary checks to ensure a proper balance
is maintained without losing sight of the overall long-
term objectives. The arguments they foster (and cause !)
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encourage considered debate in the light of which
opinions can be weighed and conscious decisions made.
Media interest and speculation might increase tensions.
But greater public awareness and understanding, coupled
with more detailed specialist analysis, must improve the
end result. The converse would be ill-thought out policies;
hardly considered; adopted on the nod and implemented
without any particular thought or care. In short, chaos at
best …… anarchy at worst!
Clearly, Europe’s  political leaders over the last four
decades were determined not to be blown off course. In
1968 the Acceleration Decision introduced the common
customs tariff and required the elimination of all customs
duties on trade between member States 18 months
ahead of schedule.  This assisted the Common Market’s
becoming operational by 1970 (as required in the Treaty).
But entrenched national practices and human reluctance
to change slowed the process, hindering the development
of  necessary harmonisation. Many non-tariff barriers
therefore remained – and in some instances have still not
totally disappeared even today, although the increasing
involvement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is
helping to clarify and confirm the supremacy of European
over national law.
In addition, the European Commission (sometimes
referred to as the Civil Service of  European
Commissioners and Parliamentarians) has also been
gaining experience and growing in confidence. Some
critics complain about “Brussels” (however they define
that term) imposing its will on the rest of Europe. Their
basic discontent lies in “Brussels” being unelected,
unaccountable and largely anonymous. As with every
argument, these are not wholly without some foundation
– certainly in so far as Commission officials are
concerned. But, in the Commission’s defence, it has to
be said that its achievements in these uncharted waters
outweigh the criticisms made against it. Each member
State is represented, at all levels, in the Commission. So
“Brussels” is not such an alien enterprise. That said,
actually dealing with and working in such a culturally
and linguistically diverse organisation is bound to hold
difficulties. But sharing a common identity – being first
and foremost European – provides the Commission’s
staff with its greatest strength. From that basis they work
together to promote and encourage true integration and
harmonisation throughout Europe. The example they
set spreads to the member States, first at official level
and then filtering down through commerce and industry
to the men and women in the street. Naturally, national
preferences still continue to make themselves felt. But,
as time passes and we gain more experience of the
practical benefits of integration (without necessarily
losing individual identity), more of the original aims are
materialised.
A New Approach
In its early years the Commission had necessarily to
adopt a proactive rôle; to suggest ideas and to be
provocative in order to spur interest and encourage
support. They were also very much in a chicken and egg
situation. Policies had to be developed to implement the
requirements in the Treaty. But who should start those
policies, national governments or the Commission? The
stark reality is that in most instances, policies developed
through a partnership (informal or otherwise) between
the two. Having heard national politicians and officials
views, the Commission usually developed a policy
document for consideration with interested partners.
From discussions on those early (often crude) policy
issues a vehicle had to be found, when sufficient
agreement had been reached, to implement them and to
provide necessary checks to ensure that the vehicle kept
on course. Numerous directives were then proposed by
the Commission (at the behest of the Member States,
who, in turn, had often been prompted by relevant
interest groups and lobbyists) and negotiated with
officials from relevant government departments in the
Member States prior to formal adoption by the Council
of Ministers. As knowledge of and interest in the Market
has grown, so too has the work and power of the
Commission. Such has been the extent of this in recent
years that the  European Parliament too has had to grow
to protect the interests of all EU citizens and check that
the Commission plays its proper role.
When EEC (now EU) directives were developing,
the Commission worked hard with the Member States to
encourage clear understanding and to promote
awareness. The degree of success achieved depended
largely on the amount of work invested and the interest
(i.e. commitment) of the people involved – at all levels:
official; legal; technical; commercial and so on. The
earlier (Old Approach) directives were highly
prescriptive and often attached annexes listing the sole
standards in conformity with which manufacturers had
to make their products. Naturally, this gave rise to
discontent. Faster technological advances were not made
at the same (slower) pace of standards development.
This and  purchasers increasingly sophisticated demands,
led manufacturers to argue that the Commission was
thwarting business and progress. An important result
from these comments was that the Commission together
with the European standardisation bodies and others
developed a new type of  directive. The so-called New
Approach introduced in the mid-1980s provided a more
flexible régime for compliance with the directive’s
requirements. They were not at all prescriptive and
offered those subject to their requirements the option of
either manufacturing goods in accordance with the
directive’s essential health and safety requirements
(ESR), or with the relevant Harmonised European
Standard(s) which carry with them a presumption of
conformity with the ESRs. Again, Commission officials
worked with those in the member States to ensure the
timely and smooth implementation of these directives.
A level playing field?
Given such lengthy and detailed negotiation (including
consultation with interested parties outside of
government), one might be forgiven for thinking that
the level playing field was assured as a result of the21
adoption of the various directives designed to create a
common régime for the manufacture and marking of
products for sale and use within EU markets. Perhaps it
should have been. But to many in business, it has long
seemed a far distant goal.
What does the term “level playing field” actually
mean? To understand the concept, one has to take a step
back and consider what gave rise to it. In this context, we
are considering EU directives which contain equal
(horizontal) requirements for the manufacture,
conformity testing and marking of goods subject to
those relevant directives for  their sale and or use in one
or more of the current 15 EU member States markets.
This is achieved primarily as a result of technical
harmonisation processes, principally the development
and adoption of harmonised European standards to
support particular directives. However, as indicated
above, in the event that no such standards are available
or should manufacturers feel able to demonstrate
compliance by other preferred means, the directives
also provide the option of compliance with general
essential safety requirements. Whichever compliance
route is chosen, it (and the choice) is available equally
to all those subject to the requirements of relevant
directives and offering their goods for sale or use on the
Community market. Thus transparency and equality
should be ensured, resulting in uniform requirements to
reduce the costs on business and so encourage greater
and fairer competition.
The Commission’s 1985 White Paper on the
Completion of the Internal Market set out the legislative
programme and timetable for the removal of remaining
barriers to trade by 1992 i.e. the preparation for the real
opening of the Internal Market (as the Common Market
had come to be known). Arguably, the main reason for
this initiative was to commit Member States to relinquish
measures (i.e. tariff barriers) which had been introduced
to protect national interests and hinder competition
from other countries. Such measures may have been
(and probably were) entirely justifiable given the special
circumstances which gave rise to them originally. But
the world had changed. In post-war Europe, a new spirit
of unity and mutual recognition was growing. Earlier
justifications for national protectionist measures were
fast redundant. In their wisdom, the political leaders and
the Commission saw the danger of relying only on
human goodwill to achieve their aims – they saw the
need for disciplines to be introduced to ensure that their
objectives were met …… properly and on time.  The
White Paper provided just such a discipline. It provided
for innovation on a massive scale. Never before had so
many countries joined voluntarily to create a political,
legal and economic environment for the mutual
acceptance and recognition of each others products.
Negotiations on the development of New Approach
directives therefore accelerated so that they were
formally adopted in good time for the Member States to
transpose their requirements into their own national
laws AND to provide sufficient transitional arrangements
while those affected by them adapted their manufacturing
and other processes to the changed requirements before
those directives entered fully into force and their
requirements became obligatory on those subject to
them.
This gave lawyers and administrators heavy
workloads to meet deadlines for transposition of
directives into national laws. (Failure would surely
result in infraction proceedings being taken against the
Member State(s) concerned by the Commission under
Article 169 of the Rome Treaty. Something which
Member States prefer to avoid if at all possible.) It also
set manufacturers the task of understanding the “new”
legislation and making their goods in total compliance
with it in order to benefit from the new trade opportunities
available in Europe.
No administrator or lawyer could (or should)
encourage the breaking of the law. But, experience
shows that it is unrealistic to assume that everything will
work properly the first time when there has been no
previous experience of or dress rehearsal for the changes
brought about by the creation of the Internal Market.
Seeing sometimes differing national approaches and
significant differences between the different language
versions of the directives entering into force, some
counseled against early compliance – preferring instead
to wait for the necessary clarifications and uniformity to
be obtained. Sometimes the directives’ scopes were
called into question. For example when does a toy stop
being a toy and instead merit classification as a machine?
Equally, questions arose (and still arise) about the
categorization of a product under the directive. The
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Directive (89/
686/EEC, as amended) is a case in point. That text of that
directive names only two categories of PPE within its
scope. But, on reading the conformity assessment
procedures, it becomes clear that there is an unnamed
third category which also has to be tested by a properly
approved and appointed organisation before the
manufacturer may properly affix the CE marking to the
goods in question. Who decides whether the
manufacturer and/or the Test House have understood
and complied with the relevant directive properly when
the wording of the directive is not entirely clear? And to
whom do fellow manufacturers turn when apparently
identical products are treated differently, yet each is
freely available on the Market?
Clarity and Certainty
Made aware by Governments and others that they are
legally responsible for complying properly with the
requirements of relevant directives (including the CE
marking), manufacturers and their representative
organisations started to seek guidance on how to comply
with directives (“the new European legislation”)
affecting their businesses and products. Some
Governments felt perhaps even more vulnerable than
the manufacturers at whom their legislation was directed,
knowing that, in the event of dispute, the manufacturer
would claim he had only done what the Government had
told him! Naturally, no Government wished to risk22
embarrassment and even less to be subject to Court
proceedings. Other Governments genuinely wished to
help their industries, but lacked sufficient resources to
do anything much more than to introduce the transposing
legislation.  Often, they also suffered both from very
limited resources and were dealing with a more sceptical
public. The British Government felt a duty not only to
implement the directives properly but also to encourage
correct compliance. The many and varied imperfections
of the former increased the need for the latter. It seemed
that as the numbers of those working with the new
legislation grew, so too did the number of questions
(and possible solutions) about that legislation. Suddenly,
one found numerous “experts” – but on what was their
expertise founded? As ever, some were better (and more
reliable) than others. For example, those who had long
been associated with an industry sector and the
development of particular directives affecting it could
be more safely relied upon than perhaps some of the
more recent newcomers. Those involved in the technical
standardisation process had particularly valuable
knowledge, yet it is only comparatively recently that
some of the national (and European!) standardisation
bodies have entered the business of providing guidance
and advice on matters of interpretation and compliance.
Apart from a few Governments, it was largely the Test
Houses who took this lead initially. And cynics have
argued that they only did so because it cemented their
business and gave them a free hand to require tests
which perhaps the directive(s) did not strictly require.
Perhaps there may be some truth in that. But, if the Test
Houses misunderstood directives, they risked losing
their reputation and thus their business. Apart from
perhaps an odd few who saw the chance of making a fast
buck, most adopted a more realistic and responsible
approach to their work. Not only did they work with the
Commission and government officials to make sense of
the often strange language used in directives, they also
collaborated with each other to develop common test
methods or to agree a common understanding of test
methods specified in relevant harmonised European
standards. By these means, in addition to the others
mentioned previously in this article, manufacturers’
faith started to grow in the directives to which they were
subject and the single Market whose base they formed.
Despite all those efforts, significant problems still
arose. And the more questions that were asked, the more
potentially correct answers there appeared to be – and
the more experts appeared to provide those answers!
The main difficulty lay in the fact that only the texts of
the relevant directive(s) and its(their) implementing
legislation was authoritative in law. Any guidance issued
by government officials (e.g. the UK Department of
Trade and Industry’s “Product Standards” booklets),
standards-makers or testing authorities was therefore
purely informal and subject to change in the light of
experience. (And considerable care was taken to remind
readers of the fact lest they should forget it!)
It has to be said that many initial fears were found to
be groundless as experience increased of working with
directives and many manufacturers found that the new
requirements placed on them were shared by their
compatriots and counterparts across the EU. This did
not happen immediately, but when it did, it eased
Ministerial and official concerns enormously. Instead
of every conceivable question being referred to the
Government concerned or to the Commission for
clarification and guidance, only those involving
significant policy issues were referred to those higher
authorities for consideration. After due reflection, the
Commission might issue guidance. Or, more likely, it
would refer the matter to the official Working Group
established under directives to consider matters of
interpretation and policy. Each Member State is
represented on such Groups and outside experts are
brought in for specialist comment and advice as
circumstances demand.  Ultimately, the Group votes on
the proposed solution(s) and thereafter those affected
by that decision are expected to work according to the
interpretation it offered. In many cases that was the end
of the matter. But what if a manufacturer disagreed with
the decision reached? What bound him to comply with
it? Legally, nothing – although, of course, the background
and prevalent practice would no doubt be taken into
consideration. Supposing he decided to fly in the face of
convention. What sanction(s) might be imposed to
bring him back into line? There are many informal
possibilities (peer pressure, etc.) but the ultimate sanction
lay in the hands of those responsible for ensuring that
the national laws implementing directives were being
properly observed and obeyed i.e. the enforcement
authorities.
Unfortunately, laymen anxious for clarification of
the law were often disappointed when the enforcement
authorities were unable to provide the answers sought.
There are many reasons for this. Firstly, most politicians
advised against the heavy hand of enforcement when
directives were only just settling into place. They knew
that public opinion was greatly divided on most questions
affecting “Europe” and they did not wish to rock the
boat. Many enforcement authorities therefore found
themselves in difficult positions. They had to ensure
that laws were properly enforced if they were not to be
ignored or fall into disrepute. But how could they
enforce laws when they themselves were perhaps not
expert in the matters at issue and definitive interpretations
or advice were a comparative rarity. (The issue of
enforcement authorities limited resources also needs to
be taken into account, but that merits separate
consideration elsewhere.) Soon one found that
“rebellious” manufacturers and enforcement agencies
found themselves to be most unexpected bedfellows in
the quest for clarification and certainty. But where was
it to be found?
The need for an IMO
Given the lack of any legal authority to change a
directive, other than an amending directive or similar
instrument, and given the general desire to avoid further
(constantly changing) legislation, calls started to grow23
for measures to be introduced to provide the necessary
clarification WITHOUT the expense or delay involved
in instituting legal proceedings for complaint and
restitution. Normally, the only recourse complainants
have against alleged offenders is through the Courts. No
doubt, in the clearer cut cases, that course would be
taken. But the issues involved here are, by definition,
not clear. They are complicated by a lack of experience,
although this is now improving fast as compliance
grows. Furthermore, the Commission has found that not
all Member States implement and administer directives
in exactly the same way – although of course they
should and usually do. Differences are due to three main
reasons: different legal systems established in the
Member States; differing texts in the various language
versions of the directives addressed to the Member
states and limited resources. (There are also other reasons
such as the “gold-plating” of directives when transposing
them into national laws, but these are usually more
easily identifiable and their correction is thus perhaps
more straightforward. “Gold-plating” means including
in transposing legislation requirements not contained in
the directive being transposed into national law. This
defeats the object of harmonization; re-establishes
inequality and could give rise to new barriers to trade –
all contrary to the aims of the Internal Market.)
If formal legal proceedings are to be avoided, what
else can be done to obtain the clarification and certainty
being sought for the benefit of all of the parties involved?
Suitable cases might be sent to an Internal Market
Ombudsman (IMO) to provide impartial guidance on
the interpretation and application of relevant directives.
What is the Ombudsman? Doesn’t the EU have one
already?
As with many puzzles, the answer to the second question
is both yes and no – and both are equally correct, in
context.
The normal dictionary definition of an Ombudsman
is “an official investigator of complaints against
government bodies or employees”. Dictionaries often
credit the Swedes with this institution. However, Danish
colleagues claim that the Ombudsman was originally
theirs – but readily adopted by the Swedes as their own!
Whatever the history, the office has proved its worth
many times in supporting and protecting individual’s
rights against the State.
The Treaty of Maastricht (Article 138e) states that
“The European Parliament shall appoint an Ombudsman
empowered to receive complaints from any citizen of
the Union or any natural or legal person residing or
having its registered office in a Member State concerning
instances of maladministration in the activities of the
Community institutions or bodies, with the exception of
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance
acting in their judicial role”. Thus the EU does indeed
have an Ombudsman. Furthermore, the European
Ombudsman is required by the EC Treaty to publish
annual reports – and does so.
Cases involving the alleged non-implementation or
wrongful application of EU directives transposed into
national law may be suitable for reference to the
Ombudsman. But these are normally sorted out between
the Commission and the member State concerned.
Cases concerning the need for impartial guidance on
directives requirements would seem inappropriate for
reference to the European Ombudsman. A new, different
office is therefore needed – that of an Ombudsman
specifically for the Internal Market.
Arguments for an IMO
Manifestly, the single major factor in favour of the
creation of the office of an IMO is that, in the absence
of much EU case law currently in this area, it would
speed the process for obtaining clarifications and
interpretations of directives’ requirements by lifting
this growing workload from the Commission and
officials in the member States (who are often reluctant
to express definitive views). In this sense, the IMO
effectively becomes a mediator, facilitator and arbiter
all rolled into one. The IMO’s Opinions would be both
considered and impartial. They should be sent to the
Commission and the member States governments
simultaneously, thereby assisting uniformity and the
development of the level playing field.  Depending upon
the issues concerned and the circumstances involved,
this “fast track” service could cut industry’s, the
Commission’s , governments’ and enforcement agents’
uncertainties – saving all both time and money. Lengthy
and costly legal proceedings could be avoided, leaving
only truly deserving cases for the attention of the Courts
and ultimately the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
However, the benefits do not end there as those
Courts would no doubt draw upon the IMO’s previous
investigations and Opinions when considering cases,
thereby again speeding the process.
Finally, at a time when “Brussels” is criticised for
creeping bureaucracy and increased centralisation, the
IMO could usefully play a rôle in helping the Internal
Market to succeed. A rôle which some in the Commission
foster because of a lack of other suitable alternatives.
Arguments against an IMO
Probably, the single biggest factor against the creation
of an IMO is that it might introduce a new layer of
bureaucracy. This goes against the current trends for
deregulation and simplification. Admittedly, these are
normally concerned with the legislative act itself. But
they could be argued to apply equally to the legislative
process and so the point has to be considered. In the final
analysis, popular support for and the comparison of
benefits against costs would have to be weighed before
any decision were to be made.
However, what is there to say that an IMO would be
any better able to fill the knowledge chasm than
Commission or government officials – especially when
the IMO would no doubt need to call on their specialist
knowledge of the history and development of directives!
Rather than speed and assist the clarification process,
might the IMO’s involvement only serve to further24
delay and complicate the process? Might it not simply
replace the existing machinery with something virtually
identical in terms of lack of technical expertise and
bureaucratic delay? Might the intended “fast track”
therefore prove unrealistic? If so, this could add to the
delay in bringing deserving cases before the Courts.
Cost Benefits
Of course, any of the above scenarios can be no more
than speculation until further research is undertaken and
actual experience has been gained of their working in
practice. The Commission and Member States
governments are equally cautious about introducing
any new policies or developments until they gauge
sufficient consideration has been given to all the
possibilities and the chosen course emerges as that
likely to bring the most benefits at the cheapest costs. It
may therefore be some time before the case for (or
against) an IMO receives wider debate. But it is certainly
a possibility which is meeting with growing support
both from the business world and in some political
quarters – including among some Members of the
European Parliament.
Other implications also need to be considered. In the
first place, is it right to mix legal issues with administrative
and technical practice and guidance? Some might argue
that any clarification of the present situation would be a
welcome advance. But, depending upon the precise rôle
and powers of the IMO, it may be that the IMO’s
Opinions are no more binding than the informal guidance
currently issued by the Commission or the member
States’ governments. If so, that would seriously curb the
benefits and do nothing to resolve the current
administrative impasse. More worryingly, what if the
IMO’s findings fail to gain popular support. At best the
public would ignore them. At worst, the Courts might
overrule them – losing totally whatever credibility the
IMO might deserve or merit in future. And what of the
businesses and enforcement authorities who saw the
IMO as their saviour? They would surely become even
more disillusioned and sceptical; which feelings would
spread as all bad news does, calling the Internal Market
itself into question because hopes of easier (less burdens),
increased business were dashed. This scenario assumes
that the IMO lacks legal weight and might be influenced
by popular opinion. Of course, if laws are popular they
are more likely to be respected and obeyed. But, the
IMO should be impartial and judge each issue on its
merits, relating back directly to the directive(s) in
question.
Finally, to more practical issues: how would the
IMO be established; funded; staffed and run? These
questions would need to be considered fully when the
principle of the creation of an IMO is itself formally
agreed. But, recent initiatives by the Commission and
the Member States may be helpful here. For example,
keen to improve the enforcement of EU legislation (for
which read directives), the Commission has concentrated
on transparency, co-operation and access to justice. A
first priority had to be identifying relevant contact
points for particular directives. (These are now largely
available on the Commission’s Europa Website.)
The aforementioned themes were also central to the
Commission’s 1994 Framework for Enforcement Co-
operation, which developed its calls for increased
Administrative Co-operation (and was reinforced by a
Council Resolution in mid 1996). The same themes also
featured prominently in the 1997 Single Market Action
Plan and were priorities in the UK and Austrian EU
Presidencies last year – and will likely continue to do so
under future Presidencies.
The advantages of an IMO
Whether or not the above Administrative Co-operation
efforts succeed, an IMO may still be needed to help
resolve persistent significant issues. In its simplest,
cheapest and most easily manageable form, the IMO
might comprise a single person, perhaps with a small
supporting staff based in a single office in Brussels.
Given the amount of cases likely to be referred to the
IMO, how could such an office be expected to cope?
The financial advantages would soon be lost in the
disrepute into which the office would surely fall. The
IMO and his/her staff would rapidly become demoralised
and the quality of their Opinions made questionable
simply as a result of being unable to give issues due
consideration.
At the other end of the spectrum, perhaps the above
should comprise the core, co-ordinating office, linking
with the Commission and the member States at
Ministerial level to provide policy steer and practical
guidance on procedures to be followed etc.? To make
the IMO more easily within the reach of ordinary
people, the office should ideally have branches in each
of the member States (possibly as an extension of the EU
Information Centres). This would improve accessibility
and facilitate a better understanding of the issues in
question because they are being considered in the mother
tongue against familiar backgrounds. Those sub-offices
might well be able to resolve certain issues themselves,
perhaps by correcting misunderstandings or redirecting
enquiries to the proper channels. The matters remaining
would then represent the cases for consideration at a
higher, European level e.g. by the IMO.
Of course, such a network multiplies the costs and
could turn creeping bureaucracy into sprinting
bureaucracy. To whom would the IMO and the
supporting staff be answerable? How would their work
be organised on a uniform basis and how would they be
managed? Some officials argue such considerations kill
the proposal even before it has properly developed. In
reply, they might consider the benefits to outweigh the
costs. The sure answer can only be given in the light of
experience. But, the perceived need of such a service
ought not to be dismissed lightly.
A more acceptable solution might be a combination
of the above whereby the IMO’s central office liaises
directly with Administrative Co-operation contact points
in each of the Member States, calling joint meetings
(with external experts, if necessary) to consider issues25
on which directives Standing Committees cannot agree
or in which they have no role. Most, if not all, Member
States are also understood to have Single Market
Compliance Units (SMCU) to which EU trade barrier
and related difficulties may be referred for consideration
and investigation at the EU level. Such Units and
officials may also prove helpful to an IMO.
With regard to cost, experience shows that the
public will pay for a good service or product providing
it is properly marketed and meets (or surpasses)
expectations. Considering legal services have to be
bought, why should the services of an IMO not have to
be paid for by those using them? But, were that to be the
case, other possibilities come to mind. For example, as
mentioned above, in most member States, government
offices exist to consider questions relating to compliance
with directives, possible new barriers to trade and so on.
With a little imagination, what is to prevent those offices
from forming the nucleus of the IMO’s sub-office in
that country? The benefits here would be that the staff
already exist; they are trained in their fields of
responsibility and their costs are met by the home
authority. By furthering the administrative co-operation
which the Commission increasingly encourages, it could
be that these staff have at their fingertips the solution to
many current problems. However, turning that key
requires political will and commitment. Official support
for such proposals may be luke warm, but the case for
an IMO deserves to be considered on its merits. The day
may well be not so far off when the same sceptical
officials will be required by their political masters to do
what is currently unthinkable – or administratively
undesirable.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article traite de la façon dont le public perçoit le
fonctionnement du marché intérieur de l’UE en matière
de libre circulation des biens couverts par les directives
prises en vertu de l’article 100 A du Traité de Rome et
visant à abolir les entraves techniques aux échanges.
Dans la phase préparatoire pour le lancement du
marché intérieur le 1er janvier 1993, de nombreuses
directives dites de “nouvelle approche” furent négociées
avec la Commission européenne et adoptées
formellement par tous les Etats membres. L’objectif de
ces directives était (et est encore) d’encourager
l’émergence d’une situation comparable dans les
secteurs couverts, notamment les jouets, les équipements
techniques, etc.
Selon les rapports de la Commission européenne, la
plupart de ces directives ont été à présent transposées
correctement dans la législation nationale des Etats
membres. Toutefois, le respect de la “nouvelle”
législation est souvent irrégulier. La formulation de
certaines directives est floue et le sens (y compris la
portée et les exigences) diffère parfois dans les différentes
versions linguistiques. Dès lors, les directives sont
mises en oeuvre et appliquées de manière différente
dans la législation nationale des Etats membres.
Les difficultés qui en résultent, ajoutées à la résistance
naturelle au changement, ont ralenti le rythme de la
mise en conformité des produits (y compris le label
européen ) par les fabricants vis-à-vis des directives
concernées. Par ailleurs, cela a sérieusement retardé
l’émergence d’une situation comparable, en dépit de
documents d’orientation et d’autres aides fournis par la
Commission et les autorités nationales compétentes.
Pour pouvoir atteindre plus rapidement le degré de
clarté et de certitude recherché, sans devoir recourir à
des procédures juridiques longues et coûteuses, de
nombreuses voix s’élèvent pour réclamer l’institution
d’un Médiateur du marché intérieur (MMI), qu’il s’agit
de ne pas confondre avec le médiateur européen. Ce
médiateur du marché intérieur devrait examiner les cas
qui lui sont soumis pour donner une orientation
impartiale sur l’interprétation et l’application des
directives concernées. Une telle orientation pourrait
contribuer au processus d’harmonisation européenne,
accélérer la conformité accrue par rapport à ces
directives, éviter d’inutiles actions en justice et permettre
d’identifier les questions litigieuses qui méritent d’être
portées devant les juridictions compétentes.
Dans ce sens, le MMI devient un médiateur, un
facilitateur et un arbitre. En dehors de son rôle premier,
qui consiste à donner une interprétation impartiale
pour aider à la fois l’industrie et le processus juridique,
le MMI pourrait aider “Bruxelles” en détournant les
critiques grandissantes au sujet de la “bureaucratie
rampante” et de la centralisation accrue. Quel que soit
le résultat final, la question de la nécessité d’un MMI
doit être considérée à sa juste valeur. Il s’agit de le faire
assez rapidement si l’on veut éviter de saper la confiance
du public dans le marché intérieur et de compromettre
l’apparition d’une situation comparable dans l’ensemble
de l’UE. Cependant, il ne faut pas oublier que seuls les
textes des directives et leur législation d’exécution font
foi en la matière.
____________________
NOTE
1 The author especially thanks Giandomenico Majone,
Visiting Distinguished Professor, Graduate School of Public
and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, for his
interest in and support for this paper, which builds on
themes in his own work concerning “The Agency Model”
in which he observes that Agencies are increasingly used
to perform the executive tasks of government. That
background may prove useful when considering issues
concerning an IMO. q